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Rhode Island’s Homeless Bill of
Rights: How Can the New Law
Provide Shelter from Employment
Discrimination?
Michael F. Drywa, Jr.*

On a single night in 2012 there were 633,782 homeless people
in the United States, including 394,379 who were homeless as
individuals and 239,403 people who were homeless in families.1
In Rhode Island, a single night count from December 12, 2012,
revealed that there were 996 Rhode Islanders homeless on that
day.2
INTRODUCTION

On June 27, 2012, Rhode Island Governor, Lincoln Chafee,
signed into law the Homeless Bill of Rights (“HBOR”),3 the first
law in the United States that provides for comprehensive legal
protections to homeless persons. This landmark legislation
* Senior Associate, Sims & Sims, LLP; Juris Doctor, Roger Williams
University School of Law, 1998; B.S. Rhode Island College, 1988.
1. U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., Office of Cmty. Planning & Dev.,
1 ANNUAL HOMELESS ASSESSMENT REPORT 3 (2012), available at
https://www.onecpd.info/resources/documents/2012AHAR_PITestimates.pdf
[hereinafter Homeless Report].
2. Press Release, Rhode Island Coalition for the Homeless, New
Homeless Numbers Show a System at a Dangerous Tipping Point (Dec. 19,
2012), available at http://www.rihomeless.org/Portals/0/Uploads/Documents/
Winter%20shelter%20release12.pdf.
3. R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. §§ 34-37.1-1 to -5 (West 2006 & Supp. 2013).
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provides protection against discrimination in connection with (1)
freedom of movement in public; (2) access to municipal services;
(3) employment; (4) emergency medical care; (5) voting; (6)
confidentiality of personal records; and (7) privacy rights in
personal property.4 This article specifically addresses how the
HBOR applies in the employment context, and further explores
how the statute fits within the State’s administrative and court
systems and the challenges plaintiffs may experience in seeking to
enforce the remedial provision of the law.
Without question, homelessness as a protected category is
something altogether new in the field of employment
discrimination law; an area of law that continues to expand to less
so-called “mainstream” categories, oftentimes with Rhode Island
at the forefront of this expansion.5 Of course, Rhode Island is not
alone in adding to an ever-expanding list of protected categories,
as many other states (although not all) have also amended or
enacted laws to provide protection to other categories.6 However,
it can be said with certainty that Rhode Island is the first to add
“homelessness” to this list.7
In light of the fact that the HBOR is the first statute of its
kind, there are no published legal decisions that address the
question of a plaintiff’s discrimination in employment on the basis
of homelessness, including the methods for asserting a claim, the
mechanism of proof, and the statute of limitations. However, it is
worth noting that the homeless have been at the legal gristmill for
4. R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 34-37.1-3 (West 2006 & Supp. 2013).
5. For example, the Rhode Island Fair Employment Practices Act was
amended in 1995 to add “sexual orientation” as a protected category and in
2001 to add “gender identity and expression.” R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 28-5-41
(West 2006); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 28-5-41.1 (West 2006). Additionally, in
2002, the General Assembly passed a law to protect against employment
discrimination on the basis of genetic testing; in 2004 on the basis of off-duty
tobacco use; and in 2009 because of HIV/AIDS status and testing. R.I. GEN.
LAWS ANN. § 28-6.7-1 (West 2006); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 23-20.10-14 (West
2006); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 23-6.3-11(West 2006 & Supp. 2010).
6. See, e.g., CAL. GOV’T CODE § 12940 (West 2014) (Genetic information,
sexual orientation, gender expression, and gender identity); CONN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 46a-60 (West 2013) (Gender identity or expression, and genetic
information); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 448.075 (West 2002) (Sickle-cell); ME. REV.
STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 4552 (2013) (Sexual orientation); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN.
ch. 111, § 70F (West 2013) (No employer can require HIV tests as a condition
of employment).
7. R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 34-37.1-3 (West 2006 & Supp. 2013).
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many years, grinding away for legal protection on a number of
fronts, many of which are grounded in general principles of
Constitutional fairness.8 However, these cases address only the
general civil rights of the homeless, not how that status plays into
an employment discrimination claim, which is a legal animal of
different stripes.9 Rhode Island’s HBOR fills that void for its
citizens, but due to its novelty, there is no way to predict how a
claim for employment discrimination based on homelessness will
find its way through the system.
Regardless of one’s view on the justification or need for the
HBOR, homelessness can be fairly categorized as an
unconventional category in the same vein as, for example, laws
precluding discrimination on the basis of height or weight.10 That
is not to say that these categories are any less worthy of
protection; only that they have until now been relegated to
marginal status. Times are changing, however, and with them,
the law. For instance, Michigan, although presently providing no
legal protection for its homeless population, does provide antidiscrimination protection for height and weight in the EliottLarsen Civil Rights Act, section 37.2102(1) of the Michigan
Complied Laws, which states as follows:
The opportunity to obtain employment, housing and other
real estate, and the full and equal utilization of public
accommodations, public service, and educational facilities
without discrimination because of religion, race, color,
national origin, age, sex, height, weight, familial status,
or marital status as prohibited by this act, is recognized

8. See, e.g., Pottinger v. City of Miami, 810 F. Supp. 1551, 1583 (S.D.
Fla. 1992) (finding that city’s continual arrest and harassment of homeless
constituted cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth
Amendment and due process rights); Lavan v. City of Los Angeles, 797 F.
Supp. 2d 1005, 1016, 1019 (C.D. Cal. 2011), aff’d, 693 F.3d 1022 (9th Cir.
2012) (finding that homeless plaintiffs demonstrated likelihood of success on
claims that City’s seizure and destruction of personal property as
“abandoned” violated the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments).
9. See Pottinger, 810 F. Supp. at 1583; Lavan, 797 F. Supp. 2d at 1016,
1019.
10. See, e.g., Eliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act, MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §
37.2102(1) (West 2001) (providing protection against height and weight
discrimination), discussed infra.
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and declared to be a civil right.11
Interestingly, the Michigan statute provides no protection for
sexual orientation or gender identity and expression.12 Hence, at
least in that respect, Rhode Island can claim a more progressive
position.13 In that same vein, it may just be a matter of time until
the Rhode Island legislature enacts or amends statutes to include
these other categories to comport with changing ideals of social
fairness.14 In any event, the enactment of the HBOR does place
into context the ever-expanding statutory protections of Rhode
Island’s anti-discrimination laws.
Section I of this Article briefly discusses the history of Rhode
Island’s anti-discrimination laws leading up to the passage of the
HBOR. Section II analyzes how the HBOR fits within the State’s
existing statutory scheme for employment discrimination claims.
Section III reviews the procedural mechanisms that a person
asserting a violation of the HBOR in the employment context
should follow, the legal test to prove such a claim, and the
applicable statute of limitations. Section IV highlights some of the
logistical and procedural challenges faced by plaintiffs asserting
employment discrimination claims under the HBOR, and Section

11. Id. (emphasis added).
12. See id.
13. R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. §§ 34-37.1-1 to -5.
14. The courts, however, often do not wait for legislatures to act. For
example, in 1993, the Supreme Court of California held that a person’s
weight may qualify as a protected “handicap” within the meaning of the
state’s Fair Employment Act if medical evidence showed that it is the result
of “a physiological condition affecting one or more of the basic bodily systems
and limits a major life activity.” Cassista v. Community Foods, Inc., 856 P.2d
1143, 1144 (Cal. 1993). “We do not intend, nor indeed are we at liberty, to
define ‘physical handicap’ in terms we believe to be morally just or socially
desirable.” Id. at 1146. Although the Cassista court did not create a new
category of “weight” discrimination, it also was not that far off, either. The
Court found a way to provide protection to a class of persons who had no
statutory protection previously. Similarly, in Cook v. Rhode Island.,
Department of Mental Health, Retardation, and Hospitals, the plaintiff had
alleged that she was denied employment because the defendant perceived
that she was disabled due to her morbid obesity. 10 F.3d 17, 22 (1st Cir.
1993). There, the court determined that a jury could have found that the
metabolic dysfunction and failed appetite-suppressing neural signals that led
to the plaintiff’s obesity were beyond her control and rendered her effectively
powerless to manage her weight. Id. at 24. In both these cases the courts
may have been sending messages to the state legislatures.
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V reviews how other states are following Rhode Island’s lead in
addressing the need to provide statutory protection to their
homeless population.
I.

RHODE ISLAND’S ANTI-DISCRIMINATION LEGACY

The HBOR is nothing if not innovative. It is, as already
noted, the first statute in United States to offer legal protections
to the homeless.15 However, Rhode Island’s place in this historical
moment should come as no surprise to those familiar with the
General Assembly’s long-established compassion for its
marginalized population.16 Indeed, the Rhode Island General
Assembly has shown a willingness to regularly amend Rhode
Island’s anti-discrimination laws—or enact new laws—to reflect
the changing views of Rhode Island’s populace and the progression
of modern society.17 For example, Rhode Island passed its Fair
Employment Practices Act (“FEPA”)18 in 1949, some fifteen years
before the United States Congress enacted the Civil Rights Act of
1964.19 Since that time, the General Assembly has amended the
FEPA to include more progressive categories such as “sexual
orientation” in 1995,20 and “gender identity and expression” in
2001.21
More recently, the General Assembly passed laws
protecting against employment discrimination based on genetic
testing (2002),22 off-duty tobacco use (2004),23 and HIV/AIDS
15. R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 34-37.1-3 (West 2006 & Supp. 2013).
16. See, e.g., R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 28-5-41 (West 2006) (sexual
orientation); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 28-5-41.1 (West 2006) (gender identity
and expression); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 28-6.7-1 (West 2006) (genetic testing);
R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 23-20.10-14 (West 2006) (off-duty tobacco use); R.I.
GEN. LAWS ANN. § 23-6.3-11 (West 2006 & Supp. 2010) (HIV/AIDS status and
testing).
17. See R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 28-5-41; R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 28-5-41.1;
R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 28-6.7-1; R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 23-20.10-14; R.I. GEN.
LAWS ANN. § 23-6.3-11.
18. R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. §§ 28-5-1 to -7 (West 2006).
19. Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2–2000e-3 (2006).
20. R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 28-5-41.
21. R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 28-5-41.1. It is worth noting that Congress
has still not seen fit to amend Title VII to include protections for sexual
orientation and gender identity or expression and it appears, as of this
writing, that there nothing afoot at the federal level in that regard.
22. R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 28-6.7-1 (Among other things, employers
cannot require or administer a genetic test, affect the terms and conditions of
employment of any employee who obtains a genetic test, or deny employment
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status and testing (2009).24 These laws demonstrate the General
Assembly’s continued response to the desires of Rhode Island’s
population to see all of its citizens protected against
discriminatory treatment.25 Homelessness is simply the next
category taken up and there is no reason to believe that more
categories will not be added in the future. Indeed, the rationale
for enacting the HBOR is set forth in the text of the statute and
indicates as follows:
(1) At the present time, many persons have been rendered
homeless as a result of economic hardship, a severe
shortage of safe, affordable housing, and a shrinking
social safety net.
(2) Article 1, Section 2, of the Rhode Island Constitution
states in part, that “All free governments are instituted
for the protection, safety, and happiness of the people. All
laws, therefore, should be made for the good of the whole;
and the burdens of the state ought to be fairly distributed
among its citizens. No person shall be deprived of life,
liberty or property without due process of law, nor shall
any person be denied equal protection of the laws.”
(3) Concordant with this fundamental belief, no person
should suffer unnecessarily or be subject to unfair
discrimination based on his or her homeless status. It is
the intent of this chapter to ameliorate the adverse effects
visited upon individuals and our communities when the
state’s residents lack a home.26
or take any other adverse action on an employee’s refusal to submit to a
genetic test, provide a family health history, or reveal whether the employee
has submitted to a genetic test and the test results).
23. R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 23-20.10-14 (Employers cannot require an
employee to refrain from smoking when off duty and cannot discriminate in
the employee’s terms and conditions of employment for smoking while during
off-duty hours).
24. R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 23-6.3-11 (West 2006 & Supp. 2010)
(Employers cannot discriminate against an employee because of a positive
HIV test, or perception of a positive test, and cannot require an HIV test as a
condition of employment).
25. See R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 28-5-41; R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 28-5-41.1;
R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 28-6.7-1; R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 23-20.10-14; R.I. GEN.
LAWS ANN. § 23-6.3-11.
26. R.I. GEN LAWS ANN. § 34-37.1-2 (West 2006 & Supp. 2013).
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Hence, the General Assembly has declared unequivocally that
the HBOR is grounded in traditional notions of Constitutional
fairness and “equal protection.”27 This constitutional rationale
could apply to essentially any and every characteristic, and could
become the basis for any future anti-discrimination statute or
amendment for categories that have not yet received legal
protection in Rhode Island.
Notably, although the HBOR’s rationale is clear, the statute
makes no finding or declaration that homeless persons were the
subjects of discriminatory treatment to begin with.28 That is not
to say that the statute is merely aspirational; it is a statute with
teeth, providing for the prosecution of a civil action for damages.29
However, if homeless discrimination is (or was) a problem in
Rhode Island as it relates to employment discrimination, this
cannot be gleaned from the content of the statute, which states
only that it intends “to ameliorate the adverse effects” of
homelessness.30 By way of comparison, the FEPA, in addressing
discrimination in employment, declares as follows:
The denial of equal employment opportunities because of
such discrimination and the consequent failure to utilize
the productive capacities of individuals to fullest extent
deprive large segments of the population of the state of
earnings necessary to maintain decent standards of
living, necessitates their resort to public relief, and
intensifies group conflicts, thereby resulting in grave
injury to the public safety, health, and welfare.31
This may not be a fair comparison, where the HBOR deals with
more than just employment discrimination while the FEPA
exclusively addresses employment.32 That said, the question
27. See id. The FEPA shares a similar rationale in that the statute
declares that it is “the public policy of this state to foster the employment of
all individuals in this state in accordance with their fullest capacities . . .”
R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 28-5-2 (West 2006).
28. See R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 34-37.1-2.
29. R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 34-37.1-4 (West 2006 & Supp. 2013).
30. R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 34-37.1-2. That is not to say that the author
takes the position that there was no pressing need for the HBOR. To be sure,
the General Assembly and Governor, as representatives of the citizens of the
State, made the HBOR the law of the land.
31. R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 28-5-2.
32. R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 34-37.1-3 (West 2006 & Supp. 2013); R.I. GEN.
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turns to how a homeless person can pursue a claim of employment
discrimination if he or she believes the HBOR has been violated.
II. PROTECTION AGAINST DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT

As noted previously, the HBOR addresses a homeless person’s
right to employment:
A person experiencing homelessness . . . [h]as the right
not to face discrimination while seeking or maintaining
employment due to his or her lack of permanent mailing
address, or his or her mailing address being that of a
shelter or social service provider.33
Given its plain meaning, this section seems to codify the
general principle that a homeless person enjoys the same
protections as those afforded under the Rhode Island FEPA and
the Rhode Island Civil Rights Act (“RICRA”).34 However, the
FEPA makes it unmistakably clear that “it shall be an unlawful
employment practice” to (1) refuse to hire an applicant; (2)
discharge an employee; or (3) discriminate against an employee in
the terms and conditions of employment because of a person’s
“race or color, religion, sex, sexual orientation, gender identity or
expression, disability, age, or country of ancestral origin.”35 The
RICRA precludes discrimination more broadly as follows:
All persons within the state, regardless of race, color,
religion, sex, disability, age, or country of ancestral
origin, have, except as otherwise provided or permitted by
law, the same rights to make and enforce contracts, to
inherit, purchase, to lease, sell, hold, and convey real and
personal property, to sue, be parties, give evidence, and to
LAWS ANN. § 28-5-5 (West 2006).
33. R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 34-37.1-3(3).
34. R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. §§ 42-112-1 to -2 (West 2006 & Supp. 2013).
Under the FEPA those protections include, among other things, freedom from
discrimination in hiring, discharge, terms and conditions of employment,
matters directly or indirectly related to employment, and (for disabled
employees) a refusal to accommodate. R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 28-5-7(1) (West
2006). The RICRA, on the other hand, provides exceptionally broad
protections that are virtually limitless, providing that no one in the
enumerated categories could be denied the “equal benefit of all laws.” R.I.
GEN. LAWS ANN. § 42-112-1(a).
35. R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 28-5-7(1).
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the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for
the security of persons and property . . . 36
The term “homelessness” is nowhere to be found in either the
FEPA or the RICRA.37 Although the General Assembly did not
expressly declare discrimination in employment based on
homelessness to be “unlawful,” it is clear that was its intent in
enacting the HBOR and in providing a remedy in the courts.38
That intent, however, may be swallowed up by the verbiage.
It is also worth noting that the FEPA makes clear that the
right of persons to be free from discrimination is a civil right,39
while the RICRA (which has the term “Civil Rights” in its title)
clearly views protection against discrimination as a civil right.40
When the HBOR speaks of rights, it employs the term “has the
right to . . .” rather than affirmatively declaring such rights to be
so-called civil rights.41 One may argue that this is merely a
semantic distinction, but the words say what they say.
Nonetheless, the legislative intent seems to contemplate that a
homeless person’s right to be free from discrimination is indeed a
civil right, insofar as the statute makes reference to the Rhode
Island Constitution as a basis for the law.42 Ultimately, this has
no legal effect and will likely never matter in an action for redress
under the HBOR for discrimination. However, there is a clear
distinction between affirmatively declaring something a civil right
and simply declaring that someone has a right to be free from
something. The question is more appropriately directed toward
how the HBOR would address the case of a person who claims
their employment rights were impaired due to their homeless
status.
36. R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 42-112-1(a).
37. R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. §§ 28-5-1 to -7; R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. §§ 42-112-1
to -2.
38. See R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 34-37.1-4 (West 2006 & Supp. 2013) (“In
any civil action alleging a violation of this chapter, the court may award
appropriate injunctive and declaratory relief, actual damages, and reasonable
attorneys’ fees and costs to a prevailing plaintiff.”).
39. R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 28-5-5 (West 2006).
40. See R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 42-112-1. Civil rights are defined as “[t]he
individual rights of personal liberty guaranteed by the Bill of Rights . . .”
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 281 (9th ed. 2009).
41. R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 34-37.1-3 (West 2006 & Supp. 2013) (emphasis
added).
42. See R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 34-37.1-2 (West 2006 & Supp. 2013).
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III. WHERE DOES A HOMELESS PLAINTIFF BEGIN?

For a prospective plaintiff, there is no real guidance in the
HBOR regarding the first step toward asserting an employment
discrimination claim as a result of being homeless. Should the
prospective plaintiff look to the FEPA, the RICRA, or neither? If a
challenge should be made to the statute’s applicability in the
context of whether it should be treated identically to other
employment discrimination claims filed under the FEPA or
RICRA, the Rhode Island Supreme Court would likely follow its
canons of statutory interpretation and give deference to the
legislature’s intent:
It is well settled that the statutory language is the best
indicator of the General Assembly’s intent. [The] Court
will not construe a statute to achieve a meaningless or
absurd result. Rather, when interpreting statutes, a court
should construe each part or section in connection with
every other part or section to produce a harmonious
whole.43
Logically, homelessness in the employment discrimination context
should be treated the same as other categories in the FEPA or the
RICRA. After all, the HBOR makes it clear that a homeless
person “[h]as the right not to face discrimination while seeking or
maintaining employment[.]”44 However, the General Assembly’s
choice not to amend the FEPA or RICRA to include homelessness
as a distinct category may leave open a challenge as to whether a
legal claim asserted under the HBOR is required to be pursued in
the same manner as one brought, for example, for race
discrimination under the FEPA; such a race discrimination claim
would require that a plaintiff satisfy, at a minimum, certain
administrative prerequisites in advance of filing a lawsuit. The
HBOR certainly provides for redress in the courts,45 but there is
nothing in the HBOR that references an administrative filing.

43. Zambarano v. Ret. Bd. Of Emp. Ret. Sys. of State, 61 A.3d 432, 436
(R.I. 2013) (internal punctuation marks and citations omitted).
44. R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 34-37.1-3(3).
45. R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 34-37.1-4 (West 2006 & Supp. 2013).
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A. Is an Administrative Charge a Prerequisite for Suit Under the
HBOR?
As a first step, the FEPA requires that a claimant who alleges
an employer (or prospective employer) has taken an adverse
employment action or has refused to hire based on a protected
characteristic file an administrative charge at the Rhode Island
Commission for Human Rights (the “Commission”) before suit can
be initiated.46 Does this exhaustion of administrative remedies
requirement apply to the HBOR as well? As always, reference to
the statutory language is the sensible starting point.
Unfortunately, a review of the HBOR’s text fails to yield any
affirmative guidance. Prudence may dictate that, since the HBOR
falls under the same title (“Property”) as the Fair Housing
Practices Act (“FHPA”),47 the administrative filing requirements
contained in the FHPA would mandate that any charge under the
HBOR be filed with the Commission in advance of seeking a right
to sue. A similar position could be taken with regard to the
FEPA’s administrative prerequisites, at least as the HBOR relates
to employment discrimination. Nonetheless, and despite this
rational view, the statute is silent on the necessity of seeking
redress at the Commission in advance of taking to the courthouse.
This dearth of clarity may ultimately lead to a challenge regarding
whether such a requirement is statutorily mandated.48
On this point, the seminal case of Ward v. City of Pawtucket is
instructive.49 In Ward, the plaintiff, a police officer, sued the City
of Pawtucket and a number of officials, alleging sexual
discrimination after she learned that a male officer with lesser
qualifications and a lower ranking on the promotion list was
slated to receive a promotion to lieutenant ahead of her.50 Almost
immediately upon learning this, the plaintiff filed an intake
questionnaire with the Commission (the first step in the
administrative process) and was informed that, due to the backlog
in cases, it would take four to five months before the Commission
46. R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. §§ 28-5-17 to -18 (West 2006).
47. R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 34-37-1 to -11 (West 2006 & Supp. 2013).
48. The solution is simple: amend both the FEPA and the FHPA to
include “homelessness” in the list of characteristics for which protection is
provided.
49. 639 A.2d 1379 (R.I. 1994).
50. Id. at 1380.
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could draft a complaint; by then, the promotion list would have
expired and the plaintiff would be required to retest and re-qualify
for a new list.51 Within days, the plaintiff brought suit under the
RICRA and obtained a temporary restraining order against the
police department, preventing the City from promoting anyone to
lieutenant.52 The police department moved to dismiss the suit,
claiming that the court lacked jurisdiction because the plaintiff
had failed to exhaust her administrative remedies.53 The court
granted dismissal and dissolved the temporary restraining
order.54 Thereafter, the department promoted a male to the
position of lieutenant and, when the promotion list subsequently
expired, the plaintiff re-tested and was ranked first on the new
list.55 The Rhode Island Supreme Court took up the question of
whether the trial court correctly dismissed the plaintiff’s
complaint on the grounds that she had failed to exhaust her
administrative remedies under the RICRA.56 The Court declared
that despite providing “broad protection against all forms of
discrimination in all phases of employment,” the RICRA contained
no language expressly requiring exhaustion of administrative
remedies, as the FEPA does.57
In the case of the HBOR, there is certainly no language
requiring a prospective plaintiff to first file a charge at the
Commission.58 Yet the statute does reference the right to court
action: “In any civil action alleging a violation of this chapter, the
court may award appropriate injunctive and declaratory relief,
actual damages, and reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs to a
prevailing plaintiff.”59 It could fairly be argued that a homeless
person’s first venue of redress in an employment discrimination
context is the courts, not the Commission. Applying the Ward
rationale, such a position appears eminently reasonable. To be
sure, the Ward Court noted that there was no ambiguity in the
RICRA’s language such that an administrative filing requirement
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.

Id. at 1380–81.
Id. at 1381.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1381–82.
See R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 34-37-1 to -11 (West 2006 & Supp. 2013).
R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 34-37.1-4.
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was a prerequisite to suit: “There is no language requiring, or
even suggesting, that a plaintiff must first exhaust any or all
administrative remedies before filing a civil action.”60
By way of comparison, the Rhode Island Civil Rights of People
With Disabilities Act61 specifically references a filing with the
Commission:
No persons with a disability whose action for
discrimination is otherwise within the jurisdiction of the
commission for human rights under chapter 5 of title 28,
chapter 24 of title 11 or chapter 37 of title 34 may bring
an action under this section, unless the commission for
human rights has failed to act upon that person’s
complaint within sixty (60) days of filing, or the
commission has issued a final order on the complaint.62
Although the Disabilities Act stands apart from the FEPA,
the FEPA nonetheless designates “disability” as a distinct
protected category.63 Hence, the fact that the HBOR retains its
own identity would not preclude adding “homelessness” to the list
of protected categories in the FEPA, which would then trigger the
prerequisite of filing a claim with the Commission.
From a practical (and perhaps social or policy-oriented)
perspective, immediate access to the courts for a homeless
plaintiff in an employment discrimination case may make sense.
Indeed, if a person were terminated from employment because of
her homeless status, it would seem her prospects for extricating
herself from her homeless plight would be more expeditiously
aided by a temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction
preserving the status quo (i.e., employment) issued by a court,
rather than awaiting the results of a Commission hearing. As the
Ward Court noted, a Commission hearing’s results could take
months or years to issue and would result in an order directing
the offending employer to “cease and desist” its unlawful
discrimination, even if the results were in the plaintiff’s favor.64

60. Ward, 639 A.2d at 1382.
61. R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 42-87-1 to -5 (West 2006).
62. R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 42-87-4(b) (emphasis added).
63. R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 28-5-6(4) (West 2006).
64. See R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 28-5-24(a)(1) (West 2006); R.I. GEN. LAWS
ANN. § 34-37-5(h)(1) (West 2006 & Supp. 2013).
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By that time, any remedy may be worthless. Hence, it appears
that it was the General Assembly’s intent to allow a HBOR
plaintiff immediate access to the courts.
Significantly, the HBOR, like the RICRA, provides that a
plaintiff may seek injunctive relief.65 In Ward, the court spoke of
the remedy of injunctive relief available in the RICRA when
addressing whether an administrative filing is needed:
To interpret § 42-112-1(c) as requiring exhaustion of all
administrative remedies before filing a civil action would
render § 42-112-2 a nullity. This provision created a civil
cause of action in a person whose rights under § 42-112-1
have been violated.
It specifically states that an
aggrieved party may seek injunctive, among other, relief.
The purpose of this injunction is to prevent imminent,
irreparable injury. An injunction is an extraordinary
remedy available only when there is no adequate remedy
at law. Because of the imminent nature of the threatened
harm, time is of the essence in any proceeding for
injunctive relief. The plaintiff’s is clearly the type of
situation that the Legislature contemplated when it
enacted § 42-112-2. The Rhode Island Commission for
Human Rights indicated that it would take four to five
months to draft a discrimination complaint on behalf of
the plaintiff. By that time, the original promotion list
would have expired.
Years could pass before an
investigation was completed, during which time plaintiff
would be denied her civil rights.66
The same can be said for a plaintiff claiming discrimination
on the basis of homelessness under the HBOR, especially where
the loss or denial of employment could exacerbate the condition.
Similarly, from a failure-to-hire perspective, a homeless
person who is denied employment because of their homeless
status—employment that would likely have allowed them to
obtain a permanent residence—does not have the luxury of simply
65. See R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 34-37.1-4 (“[a] court may award injunctive
and declaratory relief”); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 42-112-2 (West 2006 & Supp.
2013) (plaintiff “may commence a civil action for injunctive and other
appropriate equitable relief”).
66. Ward, 639 A.2d at 1382 (citations omitted).
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waiting months or years for the Commission to resolve their
complaint. In the interim, due to the very nature of being
homeless, the plaintiff may be difficult or impossible to locate
during the pendency of the administrative proceeding, resulting in
possible default or other negative consequences. In such a case,
an administrative filing requirement works to undermine the
purpose of the HBOR.
For the homeless who suffer termination of employment, their
lost income makes the prospect of finding permanent housing
more difficult. Moreover, once no longer employed, it will likely be
difficult to locate a claimant (who has no permanent address)
during the lifeline of a slow-moving administrative proceeding. In
short, by the time the Commission may be able to do any good for
a homeless person who suffered an adverse employment decision,
the employee may have been out of work for months and may have
moved numerous times during that period, perhaps even out of
state, exacerbating the homelessness problem rather than
improving it. Therefore, common sense dictates that a plaintiff
asserting a claim for employment discrimination under the HBOR
should have immediate access to the courts. The statute certainly
does not expressly preclude a lawsuit for failure to bring a claim
at the Commission.
Ultimately, it remains unclear whether the HBOR requires
that a person aggrieved under its provisions in the employment
context needs to take their case before the Commission first, at
the peril of losing their right to access the courts. Practitioners
should unquestionably err on the side of caution until clarity is
brought to the statute by either the courts or the legislature. If
the General Assembly means to mandate an administrative filing
under the HBOR, it should consider amending the statute in
accordance with the aforementioned policy concerns.
B. Proof of Homeless Discrimination
Notwithstanding the question of the administrative filing
requirement, once a homeless discrimination in employment case
is in court, one may expect that the legal test employed by state
and federal courts since McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,67
would be used to determine whether, in fact, employment
67.

411 U.S. 792 (1973).
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discrimination on the basis of homelessness had occurred:
“Fundamentally, the plaintiff must prove that he or she is a
member of a class entitled to the protection of [the antidiscrimination law] and that he or she has been treated differently
from other similarly situated employees who are not members of
the class.”68 Although the elements needed to demonstrate
employment discrimination vary with the circumstances,69 proof
of discrimination is shown via circumstantial evidence using the
well-known burden-shifting paradigm set forth in McDonnell
Douglas.70 Applying that methodology to the HBOR, a plaintiff
would be required to show (1) she was homeless; (2) she was
qualified for the applied-for job or was performing her job at an
acceptable level; (3) she was refused the job or suffered some form
of adverse employment action; and (4) the position applied for was
given to an equally- or lesser-qualified non-homeless person or
non-homeless employees were otherwise treated more favorably.71
Against this framework, the first hurdle would be to show
that the plaintiff is homeless within the meaning of the statute.
For this, the HBOR borrows the definition contained in the FHPA:
“For purposes of this chapter, ‘housing status’ shall have the same
meaning as that contained in §34-37-3.”72 That definition reads:
“The term ‘housing status’ means the status of having or not
having a fixed or regular residence, including the status of living
on the streets or in a homeless shelter or similar temporary
residence.”73 Showing that a plaintiff is homeless should not be

68. Newport Shipyard, Inc. v. Rhode Island Comm’n for Human Rights,
484 A.2d 893, 898 (R.I. 1984).
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. See id. See also Neri v. Ross Simons, Inc., 897 A.2d 42, 49 (R.I.
2006); Casey v. Town of Portsmouth, 861 A.2d 1032, 1037 (R.I. 2004).
Unquestionably, the most difficult component of any employment-related
discrimination claim is one brought under a “failure to hire” theory. Unlike
an employee who has worked for an employee for any measure of time and
has, consequently, gotten to know the makeup of the workforce first hand, a
prospective employee possesses no such “inside” information.
72. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 34-37.1-5 (West 2006 & Supp. 2013).
73. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 34-37-3(16) (West 2006 & Supp. 2013).
Interestingly, the HBOR itself references homeless status, R.I. GEN. LAWS. §
34-37.1-2 (West 2006 & Supp. 2013), as opposed to the FHPA’s use of the
term “housing status,” which also includes persons with fixed or regular
residences.
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difficult. To be sure, generally speaking, the plaintiff’s burden of
proving the entire prima facie case under the McDonnell Douglass
test is not “especially onerous” and creates a rebuttable
presumption that discrimination occurred.74 Once the prima facie
case is established, the burden would then shift to the employer to
rebut the inference of discrimination by offering a legitimate
nondiscriminatory reason for its actions.75 The employer’s burden
at this stage is one of production only, and, once the employer
provides a nondiscriminatory reason (e.g., education, experience),
the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to show that the employer’s
reasons for taking the adverse action were false or a “pretext” for
covering up discrimination.76
The single biggest challenge for a plaintiff who asserts
employment discrimination based on homelessness will likely be
demonstrating that the “bad actor” was aware of the employee or
prospective employee’s status as “homeless” and used that status
as a basis for discrimination. If a homeless person is denied
employment in favor of a similarly (or lesser) qualified person, the
plaintiff would likely need to show that the employer actually
queried about the plaintiff’s address (or lack thereof if an
application is submitted) and was directly informed that the
plaintiff was homeless, resided in a shelter, or otherwise had no
permanent address. Practically speaking, if an employer does not
know that the applicant is homeless, it cannot discriminate on
that basis. This logic is seen in disability discrimination cases
where plaintiffs claim their employers discriminated against them
without any showing that the employer knew of the disability.
A person alleging a disability protected by the ADA has
the burden of establishing with medical evidence the
existence of the alleged disability, and presenting the
documentation during the term of employment, not
following termination. To hold otherwise would render
the requirement of a physical impairment superfluous
and meaningless and would allow anyone with any kind
of condition, regardless of the severity, to claim a physical

74. Ctr. for Behavioral Health, R.I., Inc. v. Barros, 710 A.2d 680, 685
(R.I. 1998).
75. Neri, 897 A.2d at 49.
76. Id. at 50.
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impairment. An employer cannot accommodate a
disability of which it is unaware; moreover, employers
should not be expected to recognize a physical
impairment solely and employee’s ‘say-so.’77
Similarly, if a plaintiff suffers an adverse employment action
while working for an employer, the challenge is no less difficult. If
the plaintiff was hired while homeless, and the employer was
aware of this, it would certainly be a monumental task to show
that her termination, demotion, or bad performance review was
somehow tied to her homeless status—surely not an impossible
task, but made all the more difficult by the fact that the employer
hired her knowing that she was homeless. A different challenge
exists in a case where an employee becomes homeless while
employed. Again, a plaintiff would need to show the employer was
made aware of this fact and, ultimately, that it factored into the
adverse employment decision. In contrast, a plaintiff who suffers
an adverse employment action on the heels of such a disclosure
would presumptively have a stronger case.
Another point to consider, in keeping with the HBOR’s
comparison to disability discrimination law, is whether an
employer is required to provide an accommodation to a homeless
employee for circumstances that may be unique to the homeless
employee. For instance, if a family lives in a car78 and the
employee needs to come in late to work because her child will be
unsupervised in the car until he goes to school, does the employer
face liability under the HBOR for disciplining the employee for
chronic tardiness or refusing to allow a modified schedule? The
HBOR is silent on this issue, yet it could be fairly argued that
adverse employment actions resulting from the need to address a
77. Kalekirstos v. CTF Hotel Mgmt. Corp., 958 F. Supp. 641, 657 (D.D.C.
1997) (internal punctuation and citations omitted); see also James v. Hyatt
Regency Chicago, 707 F.3d 775, 782 (7th Cir. 2013) (“[A] plaintiff must show
that: (1) he is a qualified individual with a disability; (2) the employer was
aware of his disability; and (3) the employer filed to reasonably accommodate
the disability.”) (quoting Kotwica v. Rose Packing Co., 637 F.3d 744, 747–48
(7th Cir. 2011)). Obviously, “knowledge” of a protected characteristic is less of
a challenge to prove when the claim is based on gender or race, for example,
where such characteristics are self-evident without the need for query.
78. Approximately one-third of homeless persons were in “unsheltered”
locations at the time the data was collected. Homeless Report, supra note 1,
at 3.
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condition that directly results from homelessness may qualify for
protection under the HBOR.
In summary, a person asserting a claim of homeless
discrimination in employment under the HBOR is likely to be
bound to the same legal rules that apply to all other types of
employment discrimination, including the legal test needed to
prove discrimination in the courts. These rules are tried and true,
but questions remain on how the courts will treat these claims.
C. Which Statute of Limitations Should Apply?
Whether consciously or not, the General Assembly omitted
any reference to another practical question: which statute of
limitations would apply to an employment discrimination claim
grounded in homelessness? If the limitations period set forth in
the FEPA and FHPA is used, the time for initiating a charge of
discrimination at the RICHR would be one year.79 This would
certainly make sense because the HBOR is codified under Title 34
of the Rhode Island General Laws entitled Property, which
includes the FHPA, a statute that the HBOR references for
defining “housing status.”80
However, the FHPA explicitly states, in pertinent part, as
follows:
[W]henever an aggrieved individual . . . makes a charge . .
. to the commission that any person . . . has violated . . .
any provision of this chapter, and that the alleged
discriminatory housing practice has occurred or
terminated within one year of the date of filing, the
commission may initiate an preliminary investigation
and if it shall determine after the investigation that it is
probable that unlawful housing practices have been or are
being engaged in, it shall endeavor to eliminate the
unlawful housing practices . . .81
The FHPA speaks clearly; the one-year limitation specified in
the statute applies only to unlawful housing practices, not
employment discrimination. Hence, any claim that the FHPA
limitations period applies would likely be untenable.
79.
80.
81.

See R.I. GEN. LAWS § 28-5-17(a) (West 2006).
See R.I. GEN. LAWS § 34-37.1-3 (West 2006 & Supp. 2013).
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 34-37-5(b) (West 2006) (emphasis added).
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The FEPA parallels this language virtually verbatim as it
relates to unlawful employment practices, including reference to
the one-year limitations period. There should be very little debate
regarding which limitation applies when one is claiming
discrimination based on the categories listed.82 However, since
homelessness is not identified in the FEPA as a protected
category, the HBOR is left without a defined limitations period.
As already noted, the HBOR is unquestionably grounded in
constitutional principles, and expressly predicated on the equal
protection clause of the Rhode Island Constitution, Article 1,
Section 2.83 As discussed in detail above, this makes the HBOR
more closely akin to the RICRA, which provides for a three-year
statute of limitations.84 Of course, the RICRA did not always
contain a three-year limitation. Indeed, the Act provided no
limitations period until the General Assembly amended the
statute after the Rhode Island Supreme Court decision in Horn v.
Southern Union Co.85
In Horn, the United States District Court for the District of
Rhode Island had certified to the Court the question of whether, in
an employment discrimination case asserted under the RICRA,
the one-year FEPA period applied or the general three-year
limitations period under section 9-1-14(b) for “injuries to the
person.”86 In answering the question, the Court determined that
[s]ince the FEPA and the RICRA are in pari materia with
respect to employment discrimination claims, we must
make every effort to harmonize the two statutes when
determining what statute of limitations applies to
employment discrimination claims raised pursuant to the
RICRA. It is our opinion that harmonization of these two
statutes can best be achieved by engrafting onto the
RICRA the one-year statute of limitations contained in
the FEPA.87
82. Such as race, color, religion, sex, sexual orientation, gender identity
or expression, disability, age, county of ancestral origin. See R.I. GEN. LAWS §
28-5-1 (West 2006).
83. See R.I. GEN. LAWS § 34-37.1-2 (West 2006 & Supp. 2013).
84. See R.I. GEN. LAWS § 42-112-2 (West 2006 & Supp. 2013).
85. 927 A.2d 292 (R.I. 2007).
86. See id. at 292–94.
87. Id. at 295.

MASTEREDITION19.3.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

4/8/2014 7:33 PM

736 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 19:716
Evidently, the General Assembly disagreed with the Court
and amended the RICRA in 2010 to add a three-year limitations
period.88 In light of this, it would seem that the HBOR would
enjoy the same statute of limitations as the RICRA. However,
with the Legislature failing to expressly indicate this, a court
challenge on this point may be on the horizon.
IV. CHALLENGES FACED BY HBOR PLAINTIFFS

As should be evident from the preceding discussion, there are
many challenges that a plaintiff will have in asserting a claim for
employment discrimination under the HBOR beyond the
uncertainty of where to file first and the time limits of asserting a
claim. Logistically, the fact that a plaintiff is homeless creates
difficulties in communication between and among the Commission
(assuming an administrative filing is required), the court, and his
or her attorney and opposing counsel. Regardless of how long a
case may languish in the Commission or court, the ability for an
employer (whether directly or through counsel) to communicate
with an aggrieved employee regarding, say, a settlement or
hire/reinstatement offer may be stymied by the inability to reach
the employee. With no fixed or steady mailing address,
communication may occur only when an employee is able to
appear in person to determine the status of the case, which itself
may be fortuitous. Similar challenges arise if the employee’s
attendance is necessary at Commission hearings, depositions, or
court appearances. In the context of a court action, default looms
if the employee cannot participate in the prosecution of a lawsuit
by missing appearance dates or not responding to discovery in a
timely fashion.
Another challenge is the ability to retain an attorney to
pursue a claim on behalf of a homeless plaintiff. Since it is
unlikely that a plaintiff in these circumstances has the financial
means to pay for legal services by the hour (they have lost their
job or been denied employment), an attorney would be expected to
work on a contingency basis, taking a share of the ultimate award
or settlement. Although the HBOR provides that a prevailing
plaintiff may be awarded attorney’s fees and costs, attorneys may
balk at taking such cases on a contingency basis since there is no
88.

See R.I. GEN. LAWS § 41-112-2.
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guarantee that, if successful, they will realize a fair wage for the
time expended. Moreover, a homeless plaintiff may be far more
willing (even anxious) to settle “short” and take the first
settlement offer made by the employer in order to get something
immediately. Even if the attorney counsels against a rash
resolution, the employee-client is the gatekeeper of the case and, if
he or she determines a small settlement amount (relative to the
attorney’s valuation of the case) to be fair, the attorney may be left
with fees that amount to pennies on the dollar for the time
expended. Such impetuous settlement seems even more likely if
the plaintiff is appearing pro se, with no guidance from a legal
professional.
Hence, there are numerous procedural and logistical
challenges that face someone who seeks to use the HBOR for
redress in employment discrimination. Despite these challenges,
at some point a plaintiff asserting such a claim will need to wend
his or her way through the administrative and/or court system
(either alone or with an attorney) to figure out how the HBOR is
supposed to work.
V. OTHER STATES

Rhode Island, despite being the first, is not the only state to
provide legal protection to its homeless citizens. As of the date of
publication, there are two other states who have taken this step.
On August 22, 2013, the Illinois governor signed into law its
version of a homeless “bill of rights.”89 The text of the Illinois
statute mirrors many of the key elements of the Rhode Island
HBOR (often verbatim). However, in the context of employment
protections, the wording of the Illinois law indicates that a
homeless person has “the right not to face discrimination while
maintaining employment due to his or her lack of permanent
mailing address, or his or her mailing address being that of a
shelter or social service provider.”90 This differs from the Rhode
Island HBOR, which also provides the right to be free from

89. Homeless ‘Bill of Rights’ Becomes Law in Illinois, EQUAL VOICE (Aug.
26, 2013.) http://www.equalvoiceforfamilies.org/homeless-bill-of-rightsbecomes-law-in-illinois/.
90. 775 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 45 / 10(a)(3) (West 2013).
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discrimination in seeking employment.91 Apart from that single
omission, the wording of that clause is identical. This would seem
to mean that a homeless person suffering discrimination in the
hiring process in Illinois has no recourse under the Illinois
Homeless Bill of Rights in a “failure-to-hire” context, a peculiar
omission in light of the stated purpose of the statute.
In Connecticut, the governor signed that state’s Homeless Bill
of Rights into law on July 11, 2013, with an effective date of
October 1, 2013.92 That law, although again borrowing some of its
text from the Rhode Island HBOR, provides more comprehensive
protections for homeless persons in the employment context, with
a clause indicating that a homeless person has the right to “[h]ave
equal opportunities in employment.”93 This would seem to be
even more broad-sweeping than the Rhode Island’s HBOR insofar
as it does not limit redress in employment to simply “seeking” or
“maintaining” employment. Ultimately, it is likely that, in the
coming years, other states will attempt or enact laws protecting
their homeless citizens from discrimination in all aspects of their
lives, including employment. However, there is no grand debate
underfoot for “homeless” legislation in any manner that could
rival the exposure and passion of recent civil rights movements
involving, for instance, gay marriage. Ultimately, the choice will
reside with the state, as it is all too evident that the federal antidiscrimination statutes still lag behind most states in expanding
protections.
VI. CONCLUSION

Rhode Island’s HBOR, although unquestionably altruistic in
its reach, does suffer from a measure of ambiguity on key points
as they relate to the employment context, such as questions
concerning administrative filings, accommodations, and the
statute of limitation. These are no small problems as the lack of
guidance in the statute may lead to a number of delays that could
prejudice a prospective plaintiff’s rights, such as an unnecessary
filing at the Commission or a dismissal in a civil court for failure
91. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 34-37.1-3 (West 2006 & Supp. 2013).
92. Scott Keyes, Connecticut Passes Landmark ‘Homeless Person’s Bill of
Rights’ Law, THINK PROGRESS (June 12, 2013, 10:30 AM), http://thinkprogress
.org/justice/2013/06/12/2139181/connecticut-homeless/.
93. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 1-500(b)(2) (West 2013).
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to exhaust administrative remedies. Now would be the time to
clarify these points before homeless plaintiffs (and their attorneys)
try to test the system for the appropriate first step.
From a political perspective, having a stand-alone statute
entitled “Homeless Bill of Rights” gets a lot of mileage. Of that
there is little doubt. However, if the tank runs dry when it comes
to practical application, was the lack of efficacy worth the political
gain?

